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Abstract
In this paper we use a structural VAR model with time-varying parameters and stochastic 
volatility to investigate whether the Federal Reserve has responded systematically to 
asset prices and whether this response has changed over time. To recover the systematic 
component of monetary policy, we interpret the interest rate equation in the VAR as an 
extended monetary policy rule responding to infl ation, the output gap, house prices and 
stock prices. We fi nd some time variation in the coeffi cients for house prices and stock 
prices but fairly stable coeffi cients over time for infl ation and the output gap. Our results 
indicate that the systematic component of monetary policy in the US, i) attached a positive 
weight to real house price growth but lowered it prior to the crisis and eventually raised it 
again, and ii) only episodically took real stock price growth into account.
Keywords: Bayesian VAR, time-varying parameters, monetary policy, house prices, stock 
market.
JEL classifi cation: C32, E44, E52, E58.
Resumen
En este trabajo utilizamos un modelo VAR estructural con parámetros variables en el tiempo y 
volatilidad estocástica para investigar si la Reserva Federal ha respondido sistemáticamente 
a los precios de los activos y si esta respuesta ha cambiado con el tiempo. Para recuperar 
el componente sistemático de la política monetaria, interpretamos la ecuación de la tasa 
de interés en el VAR como una regla extendida de política monetaria que responde a la 
infl ación, el output gap, los precios de la vivienda y los precios de las acciones. Detectamos 
variación temporal en los coefi cientes de precios de la vivienda y precios de las acciones, 
mientras que los coefi cientes de la infl ación y el output gap son bastante estables en el 
tiempo. Nuestros resultados indican que el componente sistemático de la política monetaria 
en Estados Unidos i) tuvo un peso positivo sobre el crecimiento real de los precios de la 
vivienda, que disminuyó antes de la crisis y eventualmente volvió a aumentar, y ii) solo tuvo 
en cuenta el crecimiento real de los precios de las acciones en momentos concretos del 
tiempo.
Palabras clave: VAR bayesiano, parámetros variables en el tiempo, política monetaria, 
precios de la vivienda, mercado de valores.
Códigos JEL: C32, E44, E52, E58.
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1 Introduction
The length and the severity of the Great Recession generated considerable interest in
the evolution of US monetary policy over the period that preceded the recent economic
slump. However, while the financial nature of the Great Recession revived the debate
on whether monetary policy should respond directly to asset prices (cf. Borio and Lowe
(2002), Cecchetti et al. (2002), Bernanke and Gertler (2000, 2001), Christiano et al. (2010),
Gal´ı (2014)), less attention has been devoted to the measurement of the actual response
of the Federal Reserve to asset prices in recent years.
In this paper we take an empirical approach and evaluate to what extent the Fed
reacted to asset prices over the Great Moderation period until the beginning of the Great
Recession. In particular, we consider whether stock prices and house prices entered the
Fed’s reaction function with a positive and significant coefficient. Our key contribution is
in providing time-varying estimates of the monetary policy response to asset prices by us-
ing a VAR model with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility (TVP-SV-VAR,
henceforth), following Primiceri (2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2005). More specifically,
we interpret the interest rate equation in our VAR using five variables (interest rate,
inflation rate, the output gap, house prices and stock prices) as an extended monetary
policy rule in the spirit of Arias et al. (2015), Belongia and Ireland (2016a,b), Canova
and Gambetti (2009) and Primiceri (2005), among others. This set-up allows us to track
the systematic response to stock prices and house prices over our sample period, which
goes from 1975:Q2 to 2008:Q4. As far as we know, the seminal contributions in this liter-
ature (cf. Bernanke and Gertler (2000), and Rigobon and Sack (2003)) and the following
extensions are all based on models with constant coefficients. Note that an alternative
approach to using a TVP-SV-VAR is to estimate constant coefficient models for either
rolling window samples or various sub-samples. However, the TVP-SV-VAR has the ad-
vantage of being more flexible as it jointly takes into account the information contained
by all the variables in the full sample while at the same time explicitly modeling time
variation in both the coefficients and the volatility.
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the response to stock prices was mild and episodic, the response to house prices was
significant, from a statistical and economic point of view. We estimate the coefficient for
house price growth to be about one third of the inflation coefficient in the policy rule.
Moreover, we identify non-negligible time variation in the coefficients. The coefficient
on stock prices is higher around the end of the 1980s, thus capturing a marked response
to the stock market crash of 1987, whereas it is relatively low and stable in the last part of
the sample. The coefficient on house price inflation exhibits more pronounced swings: we
identify a lower response around the mid 1990s and also in the Pre-Great Recession period.
Nevertheless, the coefficient is large, even in the pre-Great Recession period. Finally, the
coefficients on inflation and the output gap and the interest rate smoothing term are
relatively stable over time, with the partial exception of the mid 1990s.
While we do not find major evidence of time variation in the coefficients for inflation
and the output gap, the use of a model with time-varying coefficients and stochastic
volatility turns out to be crucial for detecting the Fed’s response to house price growth
and to stock market returns. In fact, when we shut down time variation in the coefficients
or stochastic volatility, the model does not find any response to house price growth.
Moreover, the response to stock prices is estimated to be not statistically significant in
a model with constant coefficients. Therefore, we conclude that having a model with
time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility is important in order to analyze our
research question. Notably, the finding of a significant response to house prices is robust
to changing the order of the variables in our VAR.
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, we obviously comple-
ment previous studies on the monetary policy response to stock prices. Bernanke and
Gertler (2000) estimate Taylor-type rules with a GMM methodology for the US and
Japan and find evidence of a very small response, always statistically insignificant and in
some cases even negative. Rigobon and Sack (2003) estimate a VAR identified through
heteroskedasticity and conclude that the response of monetary policy to stock prices in
the US was positive and significant over the period 1985-1999. The same result emerges in
Our main result is that the Fed responded to house prices and stock prices. While
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Castelnuovo and Nistico` (2010), in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model where monetary policy responds to fluctuations in the stock market, and
in Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009), in a VAR identified using a combination of short-run
and long-run restrictions. In contrast, a more recent literature argues that the Rigobon
and Sack’s finding is confined to specific periods (around the 1987 stock market crash in
Furlanetto (2011) and more generally around recession periods in Ravn (2012)). While
those results rely on various forms of sample splitting, they may highlight some instability
in the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices, thus calling for the use of
a model with time-varying coefficients.
Interestingly, while several papers study the response of monetary policy to stock
prices, the response to house prices is largely unexplored. A noteworthy exception is
Finocchiaro and von Heideken (2013) who estimate the house price coefficient in a mon-
etary policy rule and find evidence of a positive and significant response in the US in
the context of a DSGE model. Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2013) provide evidence on the
(conditional) response of interest rates to shocks originating in the stock market and in
the housing sector but do not report the coefficients in the interest rate equation.
We contribute also to a second (and more recent) strand of literature that introduces
asset prices into TVP-SV-VAR models. Prieto et al. (2016) use data on several finan-
cial variables (including house prices and stock prices) to investigate the time-varying
transmission mechanism and the relative importance of various financial shocks. How-
ever, they do not consider the systematic component of monetary policy in their analysis.
Gali and Gambetti (2015) study the time-varying response of stock prices to monetary
policy shocks. While our model is similar, we focus on the opposite relationship, i.e. the
response of monetary policy to stock prices.
Finally, we also contribute to the debate on the monetary policy stance in the pre-
Great Recession period initiated by Taylor (2007, 2009) who argues that the interest was
kept too low for too long prior to the crisis. Belongia and Ireland (2016b) estimate a
TVP-SV-VAR model with three variables (a measure of inflation, the interest rate and a
measure of real economic activity) and find evidence of a lower response to inflation in
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estimation. Section 3 presents our results and a sensitivity analysis. Section 4 relates our
results to the debate on the monetary policy stance in the pre-Great Recession period.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric Model
To study how the Fed responded to asset prices in the pre-Great Recession period, we use
the time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility VAR model a` la Primiceri (2005)1
and Cogley and Sargent (2005) with the reduced form representation
xt = ct +B1,txt−1 + ...+Bp,txt−p + ut, t = 1, ..., T, (2.1)
where xt is a n × 1 vector of endogenous variables, ct is a n × 1 vector of time-varying
coefficients that multiply constant terms, Bi,t, i = 1, ..., p are n × n matrices of time-
varying coefficients and ut ∼ MVN(0,Ωt), where AtΩtA′t = ΣtΣ′t, with Σt diagonal and
At, the contemporaneous (time-varying) coefficients matrix, lower triangular. In stacked
form, the model is equal to:
xt = Z
′
tBt +A
−1
t Σtεt, where Z
′
t ≡ In ⊗ [1,x′t−1, ...,x′t−p]. (2.2)
The time-varying parameters evolve according to Bt = Bt−1 + νt, αt = αt−1 + ζt,
logσt = logσt−1+ηt
2. It is assumed that the innovations in the model are jointly normally
distributed with the following variance-covariance matrix:
1We follow the updated MCMC procedures suggested by Del Negro and Primiceri (2015). They retain
most of the procedures in Primiceri (2005) except that sampling of stochastic volatilities is preceded by
sampling of states for mixture component approximations to errors with log chi-square distributions.
2To check the validity of these assumptions we run a rolling window constant parameter VAR model.
We find random-walk behaviour in the first difference of the coefficients, a result which substantiates the
assumptions.
recent years, thus supporting the Taylor evidence. Our model can be seen as an extension
of their model to include asset prices in the analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and the details of the
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V ≡ V ar
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
εt
νt
ζt
ηt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
In 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 W
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (2.3)
As a first pass, the structural representation is recovered via a recursive identification
scheme. This identification strategy follows the seminal contributions by Christiano et al.
(1999) in VAR models with constant coefficients and Primiceri (2005) in VAR models
with time-varying coefficients. Notice that our results are robust to different orderings of
the variables in the VAR and do not display any particular anomaly that would require
a different identification scheme. For instance, we have never encountered counterfactual
monetary policy rule coefficients using our recursive identification scheme. This is in line
with the results in Arias et al. (2015) which show that structural VARs identified via
recursive identification schemes, unlike those identified with restrictions on the sign of
impulse responses, do not imply Taylor rule coefficients on inflation and real economic
activity with the wrong (negative) sign.
The posterior distributions of Bt, Q, At, S and W are obtained via Gibbs sampling
3
with standard prior assumptions as in Primiceri (2005)
B0 ∼ N
(
B̂OLS, 4 · V
(
B̂OLS
))
, (2.4)
Q ∼ IW
(
k2Q · τ · V
(
B̂OLS
)
, τ
)
, (2.5)
A0 ∼ N
(
ÂOLS, 4 · V
(
ÂOLS
))
, (2.6)
Sm ∼ IW
(
k2S · (m+ 1) · V
(
Âm,OLS
)
, (m+ 1)
)
, (2.7)
logσ0 ∼ N (log σ̂OLS, 4 · In) (2.8)
W ∼ IW (k2W · (n+ 1) · In, (n+ 1)) , (2.9)
3The total number of Gibbs sampling iterations is set to 150,000 with a burn-in of 100,000 draws and
convergence is checked by means of rolling variances plots. We keep the remaining 50,000 draws and use
every 100th for inference. The results are basically identical if, more conservatively, we kept every 20th
draw instead. In that case, if anything, we find that the coefficient on S&P 500 growth is significant with
a magnitude of 0.02 not only around the 1987 financial crisis but also in 2007:Q3, i.e., prior to the onset
of the Great Recession. Also, results are unaffected if we do or we do not truncate the autoregressive
matrices to yield stationary draws. In all exercises, the number of stationary draws is always above 2/3.
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the prior variance of logσt to 4In instead of In. With these choices of hyperparameters,
the priors are diffuse and uninformative and, in fact, the prior for the stochastic volatility
of the model described in (2.8) is de facto flat. This choice of priors is conservative for the
question we address in the sense that it does not restrict the amount of potential time
variation in the volatility of the model and, thus, does not artificially blow up the time
variation in the policy coefficients.
We consider quarterly data from 1975:Q2 to 2008:Q4. In particular, the vector xt =
[Πt Y˜t ΔHt ΔS&P
500
t FFRt]
′ consists of Πt, year-over-year percentage changes in
the deflator for personal consumption expenditures (excluding food and energy), Y˜t, the
output gap measured as the percentage-point difference between actual real GDP and
the US Congressional Budget Office estimate of real potential GDP, ΔHt, the percentage
growth of the real Freddie Mac House price index, ΔS&P 500t , the percentage growth of
the real S&P 500 index, and FFRt, the federal funds rate. Asset prices are deflated by
core PCE. All raw series are drawn from the FRED database.
A lag length of p = 1 is suggested by the BIC criterion obtained from OLS estimation
of the constant parameters version of our model. This lag order has the fortunate by-
product of facilitating the comparison with the macroeconomic literature on Taylor rules
with interest rate smoothing.
where m = 1, ..., n− 1, Âm,OLS is the m-th row of ÂOLS and τ is the size of the training
sample on which a time invariant VAR is estimated by OLS in order to calibrate the prior
distributions described above. Following Primiceri (2005), we use the first 10 years of data
as a training sample to calibrate the priors for estimation over the actual sample period,
which starts in 1985:Q3. The selection of the hyperparameters also follows Primiceri (2005)
in choosing kQ = 0.01 and kS = 0.1, with the sole exception of allowing for more time
variation in the stochastic volatility by setting kW to 1 as opposed to 0.01 and by tuning
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The systematic component of monetary policy is recovered from the structural repre-
sentation of our model
Atxt = Atct +AtB1,txt−1 +Σtεt (2.10)
or, equivalently, and omitting constant terms
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 0
a21,t 1 0 0 0
a31,t a32,t 1 0 0
a41,t a42,t a43,t 1 0
a51,t a52,t a53,t a54,t 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
At
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Πt
Y˜t
ΔHt
ΔSPt
Rt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ab111,t ab
1
12,t ab
1
13,t ab
1
14,t ab
1
15,t
ab121,t ab
1
22,t ab
1
23,t ab
1
24,t ab
1
25,t
ab131,t ab
1
32,t ab
1
33,t ab
1
34,t ab
1
35,t
ab141,t ab
1
42,t ab
1
43,t ab
1
44,t ab
1
45,t
ab151,t ab
1
52,t ab
1
53,t ab
1
54,t ab
1
55,t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AtB1,t
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Πt−1
Y˜t−1
ΔHt−1
ΔSPt−1
Rt−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt−1
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ1,t 0 0 0 0
0 σ2,t 0 0 0
0 0 σ3,t 0 0
0 0 0 σ4,t 0
0 0 0 0 σ5,t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σt
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
επ,t
εY,t
εH,t
εSP,t
εR,t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
εt
.
(2.11)
Looking at the fifth row of (2.11), we have
a51,tΠt + a52,tY˜t + a53,tΔHt + a54,tΔS&P
500
t +Rt
= ab151,tΠt−1 + ab
1
52,tY˜t−1 + ab
1
53,tΔHt−1 + ab
1
54,tΔS&P
500
t−1 + ab
1
55,tRt−1 + σ5,tε
R
t .
(2.12)
Bringing Rt over to the left-hand side yields
Rt = −a51,tΠt −a52,tY˜t −a53,tΔHt −a54,tΔS&P 500t
+ab151,tΠt−1 +ab
1
52,tY˜t−1 +ab
1
53,tΔHt−1 +ab
1
54,tΔS&P
500
t−1 +ab
1
55,tRt−1
+ σ5,tε
R
t , (2.13)
where the coefficient ab155,t captures the degree of interest rate smoothing.
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econometric one and it recognizes the fact that in autoregressive models the coefficients
on the lags of a process can compensate each other. Concentrating on a single coefficient
would thus be misleading if one seeks to explore the contribution of a given variable to
changes in the interest rate path.
3 Results
In this section we present estimates for the time-varying coefficients on real house price
and real stock price growth as well as for the coefficients on the standard objectives of
monetary policy in the context of our baseline model. Later on we perform sensitivity
analysis to discuss issues related to simultaneity and to the importance of time-varying
parameters and stochastic volatility for our results.
The coefficients are reported along with the 16%-84% credibility intervals for the
period ranging from 1985:Q3 to 2008:Q4 since we discard the observations used in the
training sample to set up the priors.
We will focus on the time evolution of the sum of the coefficients on the contempora-
neous and lagged variables (e.g. −a51,t+ab151,t for Πt) but we will also present results for
the long-run coefficients (obtained by dividing the sum of coefficients by (1 − ab155,t)) in
order to represent the response of the interest rate to a permanent one percentage-point
increase in the variables included in the VAR. The interest on the sum of coefficients and
long-run coefficients follows the literature on TVP-SV-VAR models, starting with Prim-
iceri (2005) and including Canova and Gambetti (2009), among others. These coefficients
are viewed as the correct empirical benchmark for detecting violations of the so-called
Taylor principle, derived by the theoretical literature. Moreover, two additional reasons
justify the interest in long-run responses. The first is an economic one and deals with the
fact that central banks might not observe precisely data from the current quarter and
thus rather put substantial weight on data from the previous period. The second is an
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3.1 Baseline Estimation
The coefficient on the lagged interest rate finds a counterpart in the interest rate smoothing
term in a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Our median estimate is centered around 0.85,
as shown in the top left panel of Figure 1. Incidentally, this value is fully in line with
estimates in the DSGE literature. Indeed, the posterior mode estimate for the interest
rate parameter is 0.81 in the seminal paper by Smets and Wouters (2007).
In the mid panel in Figure 1 we plot time-varying estimates for the sum of coefficients
on current and lagged core PCE inflation and output gap. When compared with Taylor
rule coefficients, our estimates appear to be particularly small. The coefficients generally
considered standard in a Taylor (1993) rule are higher than 1.5 for the term on inflation
and between 0.5 and 1 for the term on the output gap. However, those numbers ignore the
role of the interest rate smoothing coefficient. To give some purely illustrative guidance on
how to interpret our estimated coefficients, consider as an example the following Taylor-
type rule with constant coefficients featuring interest rate smoothing:
Rt = (1− ρR)(c+ ωππt + ωyy˜t) + ρRRt−1, (3.1)
where the parenthesis contains the inflation and output gap objectives and c represents
a constant, possibly related to the natural rate of interest. As highlighted by the pre-
vious equation, our estimated coefficients on inflation and on the output gap should be
divided by (1−ρR) to recover average values for ωπ and ωy of approximately 1.75 and 1.2
respectively.
The coefficients are fairly stable over time, with evidence of a gradual decrease and
subsequent increase in the inflation coefficient from early 1992 to late 1998. The output
coefficient features the inverse pattern and thus (partially) compensates for the decline in
the inflation coefficient. While we find some time variation during the 1990s, the evidence
for the 2000s favors more stable coefficients. Nevertheless, we find a smaller response to
inflation and higher response to the output gap during the pre-Great Recession period.
We will discuss further the implications of our results for the debate over the stance of
monetary policy in the pre-Great Recession period in Section 4.
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While our results on the response to stock prices are in line with the previous litera-
ture, even though the methodology is different, we uncover some new findings when we
investigate the response to real house price growth, which we plot in the bottom panel of
Figure 1. The estimated coefficient is significant and roughly equal to 0.1, which is about
one third of the inflation coefficient. Such a high response to house prices is estimated
over most of our sample with the important exception of the second part of the 1990s
where we identify a lower response to house prices (and to PCE inflation). The coefficient
gradually decreases from early 2004 and starts rising again back to its previous level in
the year prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 2007:Q4. Notably, the decline in the
response to house price inflation during the pre-Great Recession period is substantially
larger than the decline in the response to consumer price inflation.
We believe that our results on the Fed’s conduct are open to different interpretations.
On the one hand, we find that the Fed has on average responded to fluctuations in house
prices and that this response has on average been quantitatively important. On the other
hand, the response declined somewhat sharply precisely in the period when house prices
were growing most, i.e. the pre-Great Recession period.
Next, we answer the main questions of interest to this paper, namely i) whether the
Fed responded systematically to asset prices and ii) whether this response changed over
time. The evidence shown in the bottom panel Figure 1 provides a positive answer to
both questions. Indeed, the real S&P 500 growth coefficient is significant and equal to
0.02 around the 1987 financial crisis and otherwise (weakly) insignificant. The magnitude
of the coefficient is in the ballpark of the one found by Rigobon and Sack (2003). Moreover,
our results are in line with Furlanetto (2011), who shows that the positive and significant
coefficient found by Rigobon and Sack (2003) relies on the 1987 financial crisis period
being present in the sample. A very similar value (around 0.025, once the estimate for
the smoothing coefficient has been taken into account) is found also by Castelnuovo and
Nistico` (2010) in an estimated DSGE model with overlapping generations using data on
stock price growth as an additional observable variable. All in all, we conclude that stock
price growth entered the central bank’s reaction function with a statistically significant
coefficient only around the 1987 stock market crash.
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A positive and significant response to house prices from the monetary policy authority
to the best of our knowledge has never been found in the VAR literature. As far as
we know, only one study provides estimates of the monetary policy response to house
prices: Finocchiaro and von Heideken (2013) estimate a DSGE model with nominal loans
and collateral constraints in which they embed a monetary policy rule with a direct
response to house prices. The mean of their estimated coefficient for the US is 0.36 which,
once adjusted for the estimated degree of interest rate smoothing (0.71 in their case),
corresponds to the average response over our sample period.
It is important to highlight that our model features a time-varying constant and, thus,
a time-varying unconditional mean E(xt) = (I−B1,t)−1 ct. The latter may be related to a
measure of the natural nominal rate of interest, which is often considered a fixed number
in the literature on Taylor rules. In the top right panel of Figure 1 we plot the evolution
of the time-varying constant as estimated in our model. It peaks at around 8 percent in
1993 and the declines substantially until the beginning of the new century. Since then it
has been reasonably stable, reaching its highest value around 5.75 percent in 2006. As
for the other parameters, most time variation seems to be concentrated over the 1990s.
Finally, a word of caution regarding these estimates. Fluctuations in the constant in the
VAR may reflect fluctuations in the natural rate of interest but also shifts in the inflation
target. Our model is unable to disentangle these two sources of variation.
Next, we report in Figure 2 the long-run coefficients which, as in Canova and Gam-
betti (2009) and Primiceri (2005) among others, measure the total increase in the federal
funds rate that would follow a permanent one percentage point increase in the respective
variable. Not surprisingly, the dynamics of the long-run coefficients are very similar to
the ones presented previously for the sum of coefficients. The only difference lies in the
magnitude of the coefficient, which is amplified by the interest rate smoothing term.
While the focus of our paper is the systematic component of monetary policy, an
interesting by-product of our analysis is the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
In order to obtain the impulse responses for the data in terms of levels, we apply the
standard practice of cumulating the impulse responses over horizons at each point in
time. The magnitude of the impulse responses can thus be interpreted as a percentage
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reviewed in Williams (2015). This is not so surprising, however, since in our model the
systematic response of monetary policy largely undoes the direct effect of a monetary
policy shock on house prices. We conclude that, according to our model, monetary policy
surprises are not effective in curbing house prices.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform robustness checks on the estimates for the systematic response
of monetary policy to house prices and stock prices.
In the first exercise we change the ordering of the variables in the econometric model.
In our baseline we have restricted the impact response of house prices and stock prices to
a monetary policy shock since our main focus is on the response of monetary policy to
financial variables. Here, we change the vector xt from xt = [Πt Y˜t ΔHt ΔS&P
500
t FFRt]
′
to xt = [Πt Y˜t FFRt ΔHt ΔS&P
500
t ]
′, thus imposing that monetary policy does not
respond to house prices and stock prices within the quarter. The results, reported in the
change in a given variable in levels following a 1 percentage point increase in the federal
funds rate. In Figure 3 we see that a contractionary monetary policy shock has a negative
effect on real economic activity as in Gali and Gambetti (2015) and Prieto et al. (2016).
Moreover, as in the latter papers and in Primiceri (2005), we do not find a price puzzle
in the inflation response over the entire sample period. Turning to the response of stock
prices, the latter increase permanently in response to a contractionary monetary policy
shock, which is fully in line with the results reported in Gali and Gambetti (2015) for
the post-1985 period. Clearly, a positive response of stock prices following a monetary
policy shock is at odds with what the “conventional” view would predict, but it can be
rationalized in the presence of a bubble component driving stock prices as pointed out
theoretically by Gal´ı (2014) and shown empirically by Gali and Gambetti (2015). Finally,
a contractionary monetary policy shock unambiguously lowers house prices over the entire
sample period, consistent with several previous papers summarized in Williams (2015).
Note that the estimated effect is particularly small, at the lower bound of the estimates
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top panel of Figure 4, point towards a level shift in the coefficients on house prices and
S&P 500 but do not change our main result that the FED responded to house prices and
that it did so in a time-varying fashion. The response to stock prices is now slightly larger
and statistically significant over almost the entire sample period. These results show that
different impact responses of variables to shocks (as determined by a different order of
the variables) do not have large effects on the estimates for the systematic component of
monetary policy. Since the choice of the order is necessarily arbitrary when dealing with
fast moving variables such as interest rates, stock prices and (to a lesser extent) house
prices, it is reassuring that the main patterns are confirmed.
In a second exercise we use the order xt = [Πt Y˜t ΔHt FFRtΔS&P
500
t ]
′, where we
recognize that stock prices are a fast moving variable but maintain the assumption that
house prices do not respond within a quarter to monetary policy shocks, as in the baseline.
Not surprisingly, the results presented in the mid panel of Figure 4 are an intermediate
case between the alternative model presented in the top panel and the baseline model.
In a third exercise we extend the sample to 2015:Q2 by using the Wu and Xia (2016)
shadow rate as the monetary policy tool. As is clearly evident from the results reported
in the bottom panel of Figure 4, we can not overturn the conclusion that the coefficients
on house prices and stock prices were positive and significant prior to the onset of the
Great Recession and around the 1987 stock market crash, respectively.
The last three exercises are devoted to understanding the role of time variation and
stochastic volatility in our econometric model. As becomes evident from Figure 5, it is
crucial to account for both channels. Indeed, shutting down one or both of them would
lead a researcher to mistakenly infer that the FED did not care about house prices in its
conduct of monetary policy. While the response to stock prices is preserved in the absence
of stochastic volatility, this is not the case for house prices. To detect a positive response to
house prices, both time variation and stochastic volatility are needed. This result justifies
the use of a model with time variation and stochastic volatility to analyze our research
question, rather than a simple constant coefficient VAR, even if the estimated amount of
time variation is rather limited (although non-negligible). Note that a limited amount of
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evidence of i) declining coefficients in their model’s estimated policy rule, pointing to a
shift in the Fed’s emphasis away from stabilizing inflation during the period 2000-2007,
and ii) large expansionary monetary policy shocks during the period 2003:Q3-2004:Q2,
seen as evidence of a more discretionary policy and thus supporting Taylor’s argument.
Our model with house prices and stock prices confirms some limited changes in the
systematic component of monetary policy. We find evidence of a slightly lower response
to inflation (but not to the output gap) in the pre-Great Recession period. Moreover, we
also find a decline in the response to house prices that points to a less aggressive reaction
of monetary policy to economic conditions. However, we find only relatively small changes
in the non-systematic component of monetary policy. More specifically, we consider the
fitted interest rate implied by our model:
Rˆt = − aˆ51,tΠt − aˆ52,tY˜t − aˆ53,tΔHt − aˆ54,tΔS&P 500t
+ âb
1
51,tΠt−1 + âb
1
52,tY˜t−1 + âb
1
53,tΔHt−1 + âb
1
54,tΔS&P
500
t−1 + âb
1
55,tRt−1,
time variation in the estimated coefficients is in keeping with the previous literature using
this kind of model (cf. Belongia and Ireland (2016b), Canova and Gambetti (2009) and
Primiceri (2005)).
4 Debate on the Evolution of US Monetary Policy
In this section we discuss the evolution of US monetary policy in the pre-Great Reces-
sion period. In particular, we contribute to the debate between Taylor (2007, 2009) and
Bernanke (2015) through the lenses of our model that includes house prices and stock
prices.
In recent years, Taylor argued that the FOMC policy has been “too low for too long”
compared to the interest rate path prescribed by his rule (Taylor (2007, 2009)). Bernanke
(2015) shows that when using i) real-time data, ii) a modified Taylor rule with a coefficient
of 1 for the output gap and iii) PCE inflation instead of GDP inflation, the “Great
Deviation” pointed out by Taylor does not emerge.
Belongia and Ireland (2016b) estimate a three variable TVP-SV-VAR model and find
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The top panel of Figure 7 shows that the implied VAR interest rate fits well with the
actual interest rate movements. We find some expansionary monetary policy shocks during
the period 2003-2004, but we do not detect a “Great Deviation” from the historical rule.
In Figure 6 we plot the posterior median of the standard deviation of monetary policy
shocks and we note a period of relatively high volatility at the beginning of the new
century. However, this volatility declines rapidly from 2003 and reaches its minimum in
2004 before increasing again. Moreover, the expansionary shocks estimated over the period
2003-2004 are somewhat balanced by a series of contractionary shocks in 2006-2007.
Overall, we confirm previous results in Belongia and Ireland (2016b), as we identify a
shift in Federal Reserve policy away from inflation and house price inflation stabilization
and some departures from rule-like behavior. However, our reading of the results is that
these changes are quantitatively small and that this evidence is not sufficient to conclude
that the interest rate was too low for too long.
Next, Orphanides (2001) stresses that real-time policy recommendations may differ
considerably from those obtained with ex-post revised data. However, Croushore and
Evans (2006) show that accounting for data revisions has only a modest effect quantita-
tively on the recursively identified monetary policy shock measures and impulse responses
obtained from standard VARs, supporting the common approach of using ex-post revised
data in structural VARs for monetary policy analysis. Nevertheless, to ensure that our
estimated time-varying parameters are also relevant in real time, we plot in the bottom
panel of Figure 7 the implied interest rate path based on the estimated TVP-SV-VAR
parameters, replacing the ex-post values for core PCE inflation and the output gap with
their real-time counterparts. We obtained the real-time data vintages from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Real-Time Dataset for Macroeconomists (RTDSM), de-
scribed in Croushore and Stark (2001).4 The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows that also
when using real-time data the implied VAR interest rate fits well with the actual interest
rate movements. In keeping with the argument in Bernanke (2015), the use of real-time
data reduces further the role of unsystematic policy in recent years.
4Note that real-time data vintages for PCE inflation are only available from 1996:Q2 onwards.
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determination of house prices, stock prices and interest rates. In this paper we have shown
that our results hold when imposing different orders. However, it would be interesting to
explore alternative identification schemes, perhaps building on previous attempts to deal
with the simultaneity problem in the context of models with constant coefficients (cf.
Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009), D’Amico and Farka (2011), Rigobon and Sack (2003)).
Bringing these insights into models with TVP-SV-VAR seems an interesting avenue for
future research.
To sum up, in the case of both real-time data and ex-post data, we do not find evidence
of a “Great Deviation” from the path prescribed by the systematic component estimated
by our model, in line with Bernanke’s arguments.
5 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the time-varying response
of monetary policy to stock prices and house prices. We find that the response to stock
price fluctuations has been small and episodic, in keeping with the previous literature.
Our main result is that we find a significant response to house prices, both in economic
and statistical terms. While the response to house prices declines somewhat in the pre-
Great Recession period, our evidence shows that the Fed considers variables other than
inflation and real economic activity in its estimated reaction function. Our analysis has
no normative implications for whether such a response to asset prices (and house prices in
particular) was optimal, insufficient or excessive. Nevertheless, we believe it is interesting
to document that it was substantial.
One direction for future research is to further take into account the simultaneity in the
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Figure 1: Top Panel : Degree of Interest Rate Smoothing and Interest Rate Trend, Mid
Panel : Sum of Coefficients on Inflation and Output Gap, Bottom Panel : Sum of Coeffi-
cients on Real House Price Inflation and S&P 500 Growth.
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Figure 2: Long-Run Coefficients. Top Panel : Inflation and Output Gap, Bottom Panel :
Real House Price Inflation and S&P 500 Growth.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock. Top Panel : Interest Rate, Mid
Panel : PCE Prices and Output Gap, Bottom Panel : House Prices and Stock Prices.
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Figure 4: Sum of Coefficients on Real House Price Inflation and S&P 500 Growth. Top
Panel : Reordered Model with xt = [Πt Y˜t FFRt ΔHt ΔS&P
500
t ]
′ (Top Panel),Mid Panel :
Reordered Model with xt = [Πt Y˜t ΔHt FFRt ΔS&P
500
t ]
′, Bottom Panel : Model Extended
to 2015:Q2, Shadow Rate as Monetary Instrument.
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Figure 5: Sum of Coefficients on Real House Price Inflation and S&P 500 Growth. Top
Panel : Model with No Stochastic Volatility, Mid Panel : Model with No Time Variation in
At and B1,t, Bottom Panel : Model with No Stochastic Volatility and No Time Variation
in At and B1,t.
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Standard Deviation of Monetary Policy Shocks
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Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Monetary Policy Shocks Over Time.
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Figure 7: Left Panel : VAR Implied Interest Rate (black) vs Actual Interest Rate (blue).
Right Panel : VAR Implied (green) vs Actual Interest Rate (black), Real-Time Data.
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